CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTOR by Khan, Muhammad Ayub et al.
317 Vol. 5, Issue 2 ISSN 2414-2336 (Print), ISSN 2523-2525 (Online) 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: 
THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Muhammad Ayub Khan, School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance 
and Economics, Dalian, China. Email: ayubuom@gmail.com 
Waqas Bin Khidmat, Department of Business Administration, Air University, 
Aerospace, and Aviation Campus Kamra, Pakistan. 
Email: waqasbinkhidmat@yahoo.com 
Farid Ullah, School of Accounting, Xijing University Xi’an, Shaanxi, China. 
Email: faridkhattak34@yahoo.com 
Nazakat Ullah Khan, School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance 
and Economics, Dalian, China. Email: nazakat.khan@iiu.edu.pk 
Abstract. This study investigates the 
association between earnings man-
agement and corporate governance 
characteristics in the Chinese context. Chinese corporate governance 
system has got improved in the past two decades after deciding to 
move open market economy. The data for this study is collected from 
the Chinese A-listed firms for the period of 2008 to 2016 to investigate 
the impact of board characteristics on earnings management. The 
results reveal that board size has effects on earnings management, 
while board independence role is negligible due to monitoring of the 
top management. Similarly, board meetings are ineffective and not 
contributing to earnings management. CEO duality is not a big issue in 
developed countries. Furthermore, when segregating the sample on the 
basis of ownership type, we find that, a board meeting is affective in 
SOE as compare to Non-SOE. Furthermore, board size substitutes the 
weak external governance mechanism and constrains Earnings 
management. Board meeting plays a complementary effect when 
external governance mechanism is strong. The findings are significant 
for all stakeholders to analyze and to improve the board effectiveness 
and the financial reporting quality before making any decision. 
Keywords: Corporate governance; board composition; earnings management; 
SOE; China 
Introduction 
Corporate governance comprises a set of mechanisms that aim to protect the 
rights of all stakeholders particularly minority shareholders against exploitation 
by  the  insiders  (Shleifer, 1997). One  of  the  desirable  functions  of  efficient 
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corporate governance is to ensure the credibility of financial statements. 
Agency theory lays the foundation for linking corporate governance 
mechanisms and information quality. Agency theory presumes that conflicts 
arise between shareholders and managers due to control and separation of 
ownership (Jensen, 1976). To minimize this conflict, agency theory suggests 
that each party should be compensated for mutual benefits that will lead to the 
positive performance of the organization in the long run. 
The application of agency theory to explain the quest for corporate 
governance is an important question in the emerging markets such as China, 
where the nature of conflict shifts from principle-agent (P/A) to principle-
principle (P/P) (Jebran, Chen, & Tauni, 2019; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, 
& Jiang, 2008) . China presents an interesting situation for determining the role 
of corporate governance in financial reporting quality due to the reason that 
China has its own distinctive culture and historical backdrop. In China, there is 
a dominance of state-control over the listed firms. Regarding the corporate 
governance in China, it also differs concerning the functioning of the 
independent directors. According to Chinese Securitas and Regularity 
Commission (CSRC) guidelines, the independent directors are mandatory in 
the corporate board for listed firms. Also, CSRC made it compulsory for the 
listed companies that independent directors should publically disclose their 
opinions about the significant decisions made by the board, and unlike practice 
than the rest of the world.  
This paper explores the relationship between earnings management and 
numerous corporate board characteristics. The responsibility of the board 
members is to monitor, guide and control the affairs of the corporation. The 
board performs three vital decisions such as financial, strategic and operational 
decisions. Also, the board assures the needs of the stakeholders. Furthermore, 
well-governed corporate board directors enhance financial reporting system 
(Liao, Lin, & Zhang, 2018)). This study focuses on a sample of all A-listed 
non-financial companies over the period 2009-2016 with firm-year 
observations 13,472. 
The present paper contributes to the existing body of literature in the realm 
of earning management and corporate governance in multiple aspects. The 
study provides evidence that board structure is a very important aspect of the 
governance mechanism and they play a crucial role in the monitoring of the 
management. Board decision will enhance firm value if the board structure are 
effective .earnings management will also be reduced if the board members are 
skillful and professionals. 
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows: Section 1 briefly 
introduces the topic. Section 2 provides prior research on the issue. Section 3 
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elucidates data and methodology. Empirical results are presented in section 4. 
Whereas, section 5 concludes the manuscript. 
Institutional background and corporate boards in China 
China started gradually its reforms after 1978 and focused on transition from 
planned economy to free-market economy and from relationship-based to rule-
based economy opened its capital market in the early 1990 for potential 
investors (Jiang & Kim, 2015). Initially, they inaugurated the two stock 
exchanges (Shanghai & Shenzhen Stock Exchanges) in December 1990 and 
July 1991 respectively. After starting formal operation they also expedite the 
other regulation to promote the governance system in China, so that foreign 
investors are attracted to come to China and play their role in promoting the 
business environment. Therefore, Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) issued the first Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
in China in 2002, and later on, it was also announced that to enhance the 
monitoring of the firm there should be Independent Directors on the firm's 
board of governance. Although, initially it was at least one independent 
director but later on the ratio of these directors increased from one director to 
one-third of total directors in 2003. 
To encourage the investors the government initiated the split shares 
reforms in April 2005, and announced that the formalities should be completed 
till the end of 2007. Furthermore, it was decided that non-tradable shareholders 
(NTS) will compensate the Tradable shareholders (TS) for any loss from this 
policy (Jiang & Kim, 2015). CSRC also issued other Regulations on 
Information Disclosure for the listed companies in 2007 to protect the interest 
of the minority shareholders. It was a demand for the demand from the 
investor's group that, they should be protected from the concentrated owners 
because the Chinese ownership structure is based on family-owned business, 
and mostly the controlling shareholders manage their business by themselves or 
through their family members or friends. Therefore, the responsibilities of the 
directors were fixed and it was also mandatory that independent directors will 
report their dissent in case they don't agree with the other board members (Liao 
et al., 2018). In 2003 the qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) were 
allowed to participate in buying A-share and to play an active role in the firms 
monitoring. These regulations enhance the business environment of the 
Chinese capital market and also adopted the IFRS in 2007 to encourage foreign 
investors. 
 Khan, et al. 
320 Vol. 5, Issue 2 ISSN 2414-2336 (Print), ISSN 2523-2525 (Online) 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Earning management (hereafter EM) is defined as the alteration of firms' 
reported economic performance by insiders either to mislead some stakeholders 
by attaining desired level of profits or to influence contractual outcomes 
(García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Gull, Nekhili, Nagati, & Chtioui, 
2018). Mangers have free choices of some accounting rules and principles to 
manage the earnings of a company and to report that for the different 
stakeholders in the form of financial statements. Managers can misuse their 
power because they have more information about the company as compare to 
the board members. Therefore, they can use that hidden information for their 
benefits. Normally audit firms try to give a clear picture of the financial 
statements of a firm and managers should be compensated on the bases of net 
profit from operations of the company or stock options not on fabricated 
information (Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2002). Different stakeholders are taking 
their investment decisions based on accounting information; therefore, the 
quality of information is more important for these investors and decision-
makers. Although after the big scandals in the near past, for example, Xerox, 
Enron or WorldCom the quality of information is not as trustworthy as before 
the mentioned scandals. Therefore, it was a call of the day to introduce such a 
strong governance mechanism to minimize the agency cost and to enhance the 
overall value of the firm. 
In the recent past, several empirical studies investigated the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanism and earning management (Arun, 
Almahrog, & Ali Aribi, 2015; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Gull et 
al., 2018; Klein, 2002; Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms, & Olcina-Sempere, 2018; 
Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011; B Xie, III, Finance, & 2003). 
Research to date on the different determinants of earnings management is 
investigated concerning corporate governance mechanism especially board 
characteristics and ownership structure. In this study, our focus is only on the 
board characteristics that affect earnings management for the year 2009 to 
2016. 
Board structure and earnings management 
Board structure is very important components of corporate governance 
mechanism. The Chinese corporate governance system is little bit different 
from the other world, because of the uniqueness of Chinese code of corporate 
governance. For example the board members as well as the CEO are nominated 
by the government for state owned firms, and by majority shareholders in case 
of non-state owned firms. In china the ownership structure is concentrated, 
therefore controlling shareholders play key role in strategic decision making. 
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These controlling shareholders also nominate outside directors on the basis of 
personal likes and dislikes ,therefore they are not so much skillful and 
professional to dissent on the board (Haider & Fang, 2016). 
Board of directors is the main body in an organization which consists of 
expert people in their field who are nominated by the shareholders to protect 
their interest in the form of monitoring the behavior of the managers (García 
Lara, García Osma, Mora, & Scapin, 2017; Hsu, Lai, & Yen, 2019) These 
directors are nominated based on their relevant expertise, reputations, skills, 
and knowledge (Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Shareholders expect that these people will play a vital role in setting the 
strategies for the organizations as well as they will perform the monitoring role. 
On the other side managers also expect that board members will not be a 
potential threat for the smooth running of the organizations and they will 
interfere in the managerial decisions. Therefore, they are performing a key role 
in the organization to enhance the performance of the organizations and to 
reduce any type of conflict between managers and shareholders or between 
controlling and minority shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
previous literature on the CG with different dependent variables has considered 
the following board characteristics for their studies. Therefore we are also 
interested to take them in our study. 
Board size 
Board size is considering one of the important factors for monitoring and 
controlling the manager's opportunistic behavior. According to Yeung & Lento 
(2018) there is a positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance. Agency theory is in favor of large board size because large board 
members possess different skills as compare to small board members. For 
example; large board members have more knowledge and experiences from 
different sources. In china, the board size is from five to nineteen members 
(Jiang & Kim, 2015) which is considered as a large board as compared to the 
US and UK. It means that large companies have more directors on their board 
and because these large number of directors can easily monitor and control the 
operations and business activities of the different professional managers.  
Besides, the Resource dependency theory also sheds light on a large 
number of directors because they perceive the link between directors and the 
external environment of the companies. A company needs more financial 
resources when they are in the growth stage, therefore it needs more resources, 
which can be possible only having more directors on the board. In addition, if 
some directors on the board are politically connected then they can also 
manage resources from outside sources and there will be minimal pressure on 
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the managers to mislead the other stakeholders through information 
asymmetry. 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a negative association between board size and 
earnings management. 
Board independence  
Board independence is also one of the important characteristics of the board. It 
is also considered as a substitute for the transparency and good quality of the 
information. The corporate governance system can also be checked from the 
ratio of independent directors on the board. Independent directors are defined 
as those directors who are not taking a salary from the companies and also not 
dependent on the company for employment or other benefits (Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). According to agency theory, the conflict between 
the two main parties in the organizations i.e. managers and owners are due to 
potential interests, therefore managers opportunistically manipulate earnings to 
mask the bad performance of the company or to get some personal benefits 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the independent 
director focused on the different activities of the managers to prevent the 
wrongdoings and unethical conduct. Therefore, the Chinese government 
implemented the restriction of one-third of independent directors on the 
corporate board in 2003 to safeguard the rights of the minority shareholders.  
In summary, more independent directors on the company board are a sign 
of good corporate governance mechanism and it plays a signaling role for the 
stakeholders about the company performance. Therefore based on the previous 
studies we expect that more independent directors are expected to prevent the 
opportunistic behavior of the managers and to reduce the chances of earnings 
management.  
Hypothesis 2:  There is a negative association between Independent director 
and earnings management. 
CEO duality 
CEO duality means that one person holds both top positions at a time i.e. CEO 
as well as Chair of the board. CEO duality hurts the monitoring role of the 
directors because CEO cum chairman has more power over the other board 
members (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007). In this case, there are more chances of 
earnings management because managers can exploit the shareholder's rights for 
their personal benefits. In addition, managers hide information from the board 
members especially from the independent directors and mask the poor 
performance of the company. Therefore, the separation of these two top 
positions is important for the smooth running of the firms and stakeholders. 
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Therefore we expect that: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive association between CEO-duality with EM. 
Board meetings (NBM) 
The board meeting is another important characteristic of a corporate board. 
Board meeting provides an opportunity for all members of the board  to 
understand each other point of view to discuss different strategies so that to 
make a better decisions for the firm and also to reduce the earnings 
management (Gulzar & Zongjun, 2011). Extant studies discussed the 
importance of more board meetings as a tool for enhancing the financial 
reporting quality and mitigating the opportunistic behavior of managers 
(Gulzar & Zongjun, 2011). On the other hand ,some studies showed that board 
meetings are not so much effective and there is a significant and positive 
relation between NBM and EM (Jensen, 1993; Obigbemi, Omolehinwa, 
Mukoro, Ben-Caleb, & Olusanmi, 2016). Therefore, we expect that when the 
frequency of board meetings increases then, the board members can devote 
maximum time to with full focus to the strategic decision making process.. 
Based on these arguments we expect that: 
H4: The frequency of board meetings is associated with earnings management.  
Board Characteristics, Earnings Management and Ownership Structure 
The ownership structures of the Chinese listed firms are different from some 
developed countries. The maximum listed firms was initially controlled by the 
government after 1990, but after the split share reforms in 2005, majority of  
them are privatized and the ownership is changing from SOE’s to Non-SOES’s 
(Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2014). After these reforms the board of directors took keen 
interest in the internal and external governance systems of these firms 
According to some authors the SOEs and Non-SOEs have different objectives, 
which can affect the overall performance of the firms. It is not important that 
the firm is state owned or private but, it is important to check what is the 
hidden agenda of these owners. Therefore it should be studied in detail to get 
know how about the actual performance of these firms.  
Therefore, it is also important point, to consider this government ownership 
for understanding the relationship between BC and EM. We expect that in SOE 
the board characteristics can influence the EM in different way as compare to 
Non-SOEs. We argue that if managers are sure that there is no hard punishment 
from the government then they can go for managing the earnings easily as 
compare to those who have no political background and affiliations with a 
government.  
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Hypothesis 5: The relationship between board characteristics and earnings 
management is different in SOE's from Non-SOE’s 
Board characteristics, earnings management and external governance 
mechanism 
Corporate governance are divided in to two parts i.e. internal and external 
governance mechanism (Jiang & Kim, 2015; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). The 
external Governance in china is not so much developed as compare to other 
advanced countries, although Chinese government are trying their level best to 
improve it in a speedy way. There are still some issues for example weak legal 
environment, no protection for the creditors rights, tunneling, no active role of 
the institutional investors, labor market and external control is also weak, that 
should be consider on priority basis to attract the foreign investors and boost 
their confidence which is whether institutional investors in China are active 
monitors, is somewhat controversial, so we spend some time on it. 
We thus measure the market for corporate control by the three control 
mechanism i.e. Auditing Quality, Dividend, and Cross-listing on Hong Kong 
stock exchange. We have used the big 4 international auditors as a proxy for 
auditing quality. We used the dividend payout ratio as a proxy for dividend, it 
is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm gives dividend in a year, 
and 0 otherwise). We used the indictor variable HK which is equal to 1 if the 
firm is listed in Mani land China as well as on Hong Kong stock exchange. The 
external governance environment of all developing countries is not so much 
advance to protect the interest of the minority shareholders, therefore we are 
interested to investigate the substitution and complementary impact of the 
external governance mechanisms on the relationship between board charac-
teristics and earnings management (Chen, Cai, Jebran, & Chen, 2019). 
therefore we are proposing. 
Hypothesis 6: There is a negative relationship between BC and EM in the 
Presence of external monitoring factors.  
Data and Methodology 
Data collection and data sources 
Our study sample consists of all A-Share (non-financial) firms listed on 
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges. The time frame of the study covers 
period from 2008-to-2016. However, based on the distinctive characteristics of 
the financial firms they are excluded from our dataset (Chen et al., 2019; Leuz, 
Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). We delete firm years with missing data for any of 
the variables used in the estimation and firms years with a negative book value 
of equity or negative total assets (Khan & Watts, 2009). We have also dropped 
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those industries where the number of firms in a year is less than 10 for 
calculating our EM variable. 
Our final dataset is consists of 13,472 firm-year observations. 2009 is 
selected because of major developments in the corporate governance 
regulations in 2005 in china for the trading of all shares on the stock exchanges 
and also the is after the major financial crisis and global recession all over the 
world.31 December 2016  is the most recent year for which data is available for 
most of our variables.  
We have collected the data from China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database which is a famous and reliable source of financial 
and firm-level data for all listed companies in China (Conyon, He, & Zhou, 
2015; Conyon & He, 2012). Finally, we have winterized all the continuous 
variables at 1 percent on both side and obtained 13,472 firm-year observations 
during the specified period. We adopted the 13-industry classification (A-M) 
system of the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission and their two-digit 
industry codes(C0-C90 for the manufacturing industry, for a total of 21 
industries (Jiang, Xu, Yuan, Q., & Chan, 2018). 
Variables 
Dependent variable (measurement of earning management) 
Extant studies have employed different models for the measurement of 
earnings management. These models differ in their complexity levels, some of 
them are simple and simply using discretionary accruals as a measure of total 
accruals while some of them are very sophisticated because of dividing total 
accruals into further components i.e. discretionary as well as non-discretionary 
components (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). There are two types of 
earnings management efficient earnings management and opportunistic 
earnings management. Efficient earnings management means communicating 
private information to the shareholders and creditors so that to build the trust of 
these stakeholders. On the other side, opportunistic earnings management 
means to maximize one's own benefits i.e. to mask the poor performance of the 
company or to reduce the reporting quality of the earnings. In emerging 
countries finding out the opportunistic earnings management is very difficult 
because of their complex cash flow consequence. 
To measure the discretionary accruals we use the well-known  model in the 
field of accounting research which is Jones model (1991) and the modified 
Jones model (Dechow, et al., 1995) and estimate equation (1) for every 
Industry-year using the industry classification of China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) by using Ordinary least Squares(OLS) . 
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  (1) 
Where TA i, t represents total accruals of a firm i in year t which is 
calculated as net income from the operation minus cash flow from the 
operations,  
 
∆Rev is the change in revenue; PPE is the value of property plant and 
equipment, and Ait-1 stands for total assets of the company. Assets t-1 represents 
the past year's total assets. The last term in equation 1 above is the residual 
from the year and industry regression model, which represents the discretionary 
or abnormal component of earnings management. For removing the 
heteroscedasticity issue both sides of the equation are scaled by previous year 
total assets (Ait-1). To further estimate the above equation (1) concerning 
industry-year with less than ten observations are excluded (DeFond& 




For robustness, we are using Kothari, Leone, Simon, and Wasley (2005) 
model 
(4) 
Where ∆ARec is the change in account receivables and Ki
^ 
are the 
estimated values of Kin the above equation number (1). The last step is to 
calculate the abnormal accrual. It is equal to total accrual minus normal 
accruals, . Researchers are interested 
in the magnitude not in the directions of the accruals; therefore by following 
those researchers we are taking the absolute value of abnormal accruals for the 
detection of earnings management in the firms. 
Explanatory variables 
Board characteristics are the main independent variable of the study. Board size 
is the total number of directors on the corporate board. We have used the 
natural logarithmic value of the board members in our study. Board 
independence displays the board composition and board leadership structure 
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(Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2015) the proxy for the board composition is the 
proportion of Independent directors to the total directors. Duality is an indicator 
variable and is equal to 1 if both Chairman of the board and CEO are the same 
person and 0 otherwise. The detail definitions and measurements of the 
variables are depicted in Table 1.   
Control variables 
Following the previous studies, we also control several factors that can 
influence our earnings management. The definition of control variables are 
given in the definition table. As mentioned above the data for control variables 
are also collected from the CSMAR database. We control for firm profitability 
by using return on assets proxy (Yermack, 1996). We used firm size which is 
measured by taking the natural log of the total assets. For controlling firm 
expected growth opportunities and other firm-specific attributes we included 
different control variables to capture this aspect (for example we are using 
Leverage, Growth, market-to-book ratio (MTB), Loss and firm age), as a 
control variable. We measured leverage as the ratio of total debts (short term 
plus long terms) over total assets. We calculated growth as the percentage 
change in sales, MTB is the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of 
assets. We also control firm age which is the date of inception. To handle the 
outliers in the data we have not trimmed the outliers but used the winsorization 
method by taking 1% at both tails of the data for all of our continuous 
variables. 
Econometric model specification 
To investigate the influence of BC on EM , we have developed the following 
model; 
 
Where DAit is the absolute discretionary accrual, on the right side of the 
equation, from board size to board meeting are the board characteristics and 
from ROAit to firm age are the control variables. We have also controlled the 
year and industry effect and for robust standard error we used the method 
of(Petersen, 2009). 
Given below is the model for the robustness. We used the Kothari, et al. 
(2005), a performance-matching model, to check whether our results are 
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consistent by using different methods for calculating abnormal discretionary 
accruals. 
(DAK) it = αo + α1Board Sizeit + α2Boatrd Independent Director 
Proportion it + α3Dualityit + α4Board Meeting+α5ROAit+α6Firm Size it + 
α7Leverageit + α8Growthit + α9MTBit + α10Loss it + α11SOEit+α12Firm Age it + 
α13Industry i + α14Year t + µo  (5) 
Where DAK denote absolute discretionary accrual by adding one extra 
variable ROAit in our main model of modified jone model (1995).  
Empirical Results & Interpretation 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of table1 displays our sample distribution by year and industry. We 
can see that our sample distribution ranges from 8.57% in 2009 to 15.98% in 
2016 suggesting a fair and equal distribution across our sample period. The 
manufacturing industry is the largest in China, therefore we have considered 
the sub-industry classification in which only the manufacturing industry is 
divided into 10 small industries (i.e. from C0 to C9). 
The second part of Table 1 i.e., Part (B) represents the descriptive statistics 
of all the variables. The dependent variables are the measures of financial 
reporting quality proxies by absolute Discretionary accrual measures. The 
mean (median) values of absolute discretionary accrual (DA) are 0.051 or 5.1% 
(0.037 or 3.7%), and it is in line with previous studies. Therefore indicating 
that Chinese firms on average manipulate their earnings either too happy the 
controlling shareholders or to get their own benefits. The mean (median) value 
of the DAK (Kothari, et al., 2005) is 0.048 (0.035) or 4.8% (3.5%). it means on 
average both proxies of the dependent variable are approximately the same. 
Furthermore, our control variables descriptive statistics are consistent with 
other studies in China (Jebran et al., 2019; Ullah, Jiang, Shahab, Li, & Xu, 
2019). 
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Measurements 
Variables Definition/measure 
Dependent Variable   
Earnings 
Management (DA) 
Detecting earnings management  
(modified Jones model 1995) by Dechow, et al. 1995 
Board size (BS the total number of board of directors(BOD) in a firm 
Board Independence 
(BI) 
The proportion of independent directors to total directors in a 
firm. 
Duality (Duality) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
chairperson is also CEO, and zero otherwise. 
Board meeting The number of a meeting attended by the BOD in a year 
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(NBM) 
Return on Asset 
(ROA) 
Profitability: the ratio of Net profit to total assets 
Firm size (fsize) The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
Leverage (lev) The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Growth (growth) The ratio of the difference in sales and sales of the previous 
period of firm i in year t 
market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) 
The market value of shares divided by total assets. 
Loss (Dummy 
variable) (loss) 
Value of 1 if the company have losses in the previous last 
one year and,0 otherwise 
Firm Age (fage) The number of years since the inception 
or the difference from Yeart to Yeart-1 
Big four auditor 
(Big4) 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a firm is audited by 
international big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise. 
Cross-listing (HK) Dummy varbl equals ‘1’ if firm is listed on mainland China 
as well as on Hong Kong stock exchange and ‘0’ otherwise. 
State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) 
1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is the government 
(central or local), 0 otherwise 
Industry dummy 
(Industry dummies) 
A dummy variable for each of the 74 industries defined by 
CRC 2012 categories, 
Year dummy (Year 
dummies) 
Nine-year dummies for each of the ten years from 2009 to 
2016. 
 
Table2 Panel A Industry-wise Distribution of the full sample  
  industry 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 % 
A Agriculture 18 20 22 28 28 31 33 32 212 1.53 
B Mining 45 44 44 53 56 62 62 61 427 3.09 

















100 109 113 151 179 188 192 197 1,229 8.89 
C5 Electronics 0 0 0 14 15 16 19 21 85 0.61 










77 81 91 116 123 131 125 148 892 6.45 
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0 0 0 0 0 10 12 12 34 0.24 
D 
Power, gas, and 
water 
67 65 72 74 76 81 82 86 603 4.36 
E Construction 34 32 39 47 54 54 57 58 375 2.71 
F Transportation 56 58 65 69 70 71 69 72 530 3.83 
G IT 125 135 168 245 281 299 300 319 1,872 13.5 
H Retail 105 106 108 116 120 121 123 127 926 6.69 
J Real estate 84 90 98 106 108 107 110 101 804 5.82 




12 11 16 22 28 33 33 34 189 1.37 
M Conglomerate 18 17 18 17 18 18 17 16 139 1.06 
 
Total 1,185 1,232 1,386 1742 1,939 2,059 2,069 2,210 13,822 100 
  % 8.57 8.91 10 12.6 14 14.9 15 16 100 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
DA 13472 0.051 0.048 0.017 0.037 0.069 
DAK 13472 0.048 0.044 0.016 0.035 0.065 
BS 13472 8.857 1.786 8.000 9.000 9.000 
BI 13472 0.370 0.057 0.333 0.333 0.400 
duality 13472 0.219 0.413 0 0 0 
NBM 13472 9.658 4.153 7.000 9.000 12.000 
ROA 13472 0.040 0.049 0.014 0.034 0.063 
FSize 13472 22.149 1.253 21.254 21.976 22.875 
Lev 13472 0.451 0.207 0.290 0.451 0.613 
Growth 13472 0.197 0.534 -0.021 0.105 0.273 
MTB 13472 2.175 1.967 0.896 1.626 2.759 
Loss 13472 0.079 0.269 0 0 0 
Fage 13472 15.109 5.260 11.000 15.000 19.000 
Soe 13472 0.462 0.499 0 0 1 
big4 13472 0.064 0.245 0 0 0 
This table depicts the descriptive statistics for all the variables in our sample of 13,472 
firm-year observations from the year 2009 to 2016. Please see Appendix A for 
descriptions of variables. 
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Table 4   Correlations Statistics 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
DA 1.00              
DAK .9** 1.00             
BS -.1** -.06** 1.00            
BI .01 .01 -.4** 1.00           
duality .01 .02* -.18** .10** 1.00          
NBM .1** .07** -.03** .04** .01 1.00         
ROA -.0** -.05** .00 -.02** .05** -.06*** 1.00        
fsize -.1** -.06** .28** .03** -.2** .24*** -.01 1.00       
lev .1** .11** .17** -.01 -.1*** .20*** -.4** 0.5** 1      
growth .1** .10** -.03** .01 .0** .11*** .2** 0.1** 0.04** 1     
MTB .1** .03** -.2** .05** .1** -.07*** .3** -0.1** -0.5** 0.1** 1    
loss .1** .1** -.00 .00 -.0*** -.02** -.6** -0.*** 0.15** -0.1** -0.0 1   
Fage .04** .04** .03** -.0** -.1** .10*** -.1** 0.*** 0.2** -0.0* -0.1** .0** 1  
soe -.04** -.03** .3** -.1** -.28** -.1*** -.1** 0.3** 0.3** -.1** -0.3** .05** 0.2* 1 
big4 -.1** -.0** .1* .0** -.1** .0** .05** . 4** .1** -.0** -.1** -.0** .0** .2** 
Table 2 shows the variance inflation factor (VIF) and correlations among 
Board characteristics, earnings management, and different control variables. 
For checking the multi-collinearity we have run the VIF command in stata after 
estimating the regression results. Our data have values of VIF that are below 
the critical values of 10. It means there is no issue of multi-collinearity. 
Moreover, the results in the correlation columns show that the two measures of 
earnings management, namely Modified Jones (Absolute discretionary 
Accrual) and Kothari, et al. (2005) (absolute discretionary accrual), are 
strongly correlated with each other (89.7%). Therefore, it shows that we can 
use both proxies for detecting the earnings manipulations if the results are also 
consistent in the regression models. The relationships between earnings 
management and control variables are similar to those found in previous 
studies. 
Table 3 contains the regression results of the effect of BC on EM with 
industry and year fixed effect. We are interested to determine the level of 
influence that BC has on Absolute discretionary accruals. Thus, Columns 1 and 
2 report the regression results obtained from the linear model (OLS) (first 
hypothesis about the impact of BC on EM) of the A-listed Chinese firms. In 
column 1 we have checked first the impact of board characteristics on earnings 
management without taking the control variables. The findings shows that out 
of four variables, we found two variables(board size and Board Independence) 
are positive and statistically significant at level of 1% and 5%respectively, and 
the remaining two(duality and board meeting) are negative and statistically 
significant at 10% and 1% respectively, with the earnings management. The 
findings shows that if board size is large and also if the directors are 
independent then they are reducing/mitigating the earnings management and it 
supports the agency theory which suggests that if board size is large or if there 
are independent directors on the board, they can easily monitor the 
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opportunistic behavior of managers and constrain the chances of earrings 
unethically. The findings of the other two aspects of corporate board i.e. duality 
and board meeting shows that duality is not a good sign for effective corporate 
governance, and there are more chances that the CEO can easily influence the 
board and can mask the bad performance of the firms from the potential 
investors and other stakeholders. Board meetings results show that most of the 
time the directors are old friends club and they are not fully concentrating on 
the agenda items and other long term strategies of the firm, therefore the 
manager can exploit this opportunity and they can manage their earnings. 
On the other hand, if we are taking control variables in our model then, the 
sign and magnitude of the two aspects i.e. board size and board meetings are 
the same, but board independence has the same sign but lost the significance 
level, this findings show that in china the independent directors are not so much 
active to perform their monitoring duty in true spirit. Also, the duality is still 
positive but it is insignificant. It shows that duality is not a big issue in China 
as compared to the US and other developed countries. The argument behind 
this is that in China, mostly, there are concentrated ownership and family 
members or their friends are managing their business, therefore, the duality is 
not harming the performance of the firms. 
In addition, when we are using different proxy for our dependent variable 
i.e. Kothari, et al. (2005) model, then all the variables in column maintain their 
level of significance and the expected sign. It shows that we can use both 
proxies alternatively for the investigation of the impact of board characteristics 
on discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the results of the association between 
EM and our control variables are similar to the previous studies (Arun et al., 
2015; Du, Lai, & Pei, 2016; García Lara et al., 2017) among others. 
Subsample analysis of the effect of BC on EM 
In Table 5, we have divided the overall sample into two dimensions: SOEs 
versus non-SOE. The empirical results show that the Board Size coefficient is 
negatively significant in both samples. Board Independence is negative but 
insignificant in SOE and Non-SOE. It shows that Independent directors are not 
active in china if they are in SOE or Non-SOE,s. Duality and board meetings 
are positively significant in Non-SOE at 10% and 1% level respectively and 
positive but insignificant in SOE. Control variables are similar to the main 
model of our studies. This leads us to conclude that Board Characteristics is 
positively associated with the earnings management in full-sample and the 
subsample of NSOEs but it is different in case of SOEs. 
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Role of external monitoring on the relationship between BC and EM 
This part of the study shows whether external Corporate Governance 
mechanism plays role or not. We are following the previous studies who 
considered the presence or absence of the external monitoring mechanism by 
using complementary perspective (Schepker & Oh, 2013) and substitutional 
view (Oh, Chang, & Kim, 2018). Our study also following the previous studies 
and consider only three external CG variables that can influence the 
relationship between BC and EM. Recently and firms outcomes An, Li, & Yu, 
(2016) found that strong external institutional environment and debt can reduce 
the agency cost and improve the firm performance by reducing the earnings 
management. These important variables are auditor big4, Dividend, and HK 
shares i.e., cross-listing on mainland Chinese and Hong Kong stock exchanges 
(Gul, Kim, & Qiu, 2010; Xu, Li, Yuan, & Chan, 2014). 
We have two groups of each external monitoring variable, which show the 
presence or absence. We represent presence by 1 and absence by 0.If a firm is 
audited by big4 international auditors then it is equal to 1, otherwise 0. if a firm 
is listed on Hong Kong as well as on Mainland China then it is equal to 
1,otherwise 0, and in the last ,if a firm give dividend to their investors in a year 
then it is equal to 1,otherwise 0. 
Outputs in table 7 show the empirical results of all three external CG 
variables on the association between BC and EM Columns 2 and 3, shows the 
relationship between BC and EM in the presence and absence of big4 auditors. 
It shows that Board size plays a significant role when auditor big 4 is absent 
and mitigate the earnings management, as compare to when auditor big4 are 
present. 
In columns 4 and 5, we split the sample, based on a cross-listing of firms. 
The results suggest that BC has a negative and significant impact on EM when 
a firm is only listed on Chinese stock exchanges (SHSE and SZSE), however, 
the relationship between BC and EM is insignificant when a firm is also listed 
on Hong Kong stock exchange. The results regarding dividends are presented 
in columns 6 and 7. 
Taken together, these results show that the role of BC in enhancing 
Earnings Quality is particularly important when a firm has weak external 
monitoring. Thus, based on these findings, our study support the substitutional 
view (Srinidhi et al., 2011); by showing that in the absence of effective external 
monitoring, BC substitute the weak governance mechanism and protect the 
interest of all stakeholders. 
 Khan, et al. 
334 Vol. 5, Issue 2 ISSN 2414-2336 (Print), ISSN 2523-2525 (Online) 
 
Table 3: The Impact of BC on EM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 

































ROA 0.077*** (5.136) 0.058*** (4.265) 
FSize -0.004*** (-8.245) -0.005***(-9.810) 
Lev 0.035*** (11.802) 0.034*** (12.111) 
Growth 0.007*** (6.413) 0.007*** (7.422) 
MTB 0.001*** (3.613) 0.001** (1.990) 
Loss 0.025*** (12.733) 0.020*** (10.961) 
Fage 0.000** (2.103) 0.000** (2.066) 
soe18 -0.002* (-1.956) -0.001 (-1.237) 









Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,472 13,472 13,472 13,472 
R-squared 0.060 0.099 0.048 0.085 
F 21.19 28.39 18.13 24.29 
This table presents the regression results for the effect of BC on EM. All the 
variables of this table are provided in detail in the definition table1. Column (l) 
and (2) are the main model based on the Modified Jones model (1995) and 
column (3) and (4) are based on Kothari, et al. (2005) model used for the 
robustness. Industry and year effects have been controlled in the analysis and 
F-statistic and R
2
 value has been reported; Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denotes 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.Robust 
t-statistics in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4. Subsample Analysis of the Effect of BC on EM.  
Variables SOE Non-SOE 
BS -0.001** (-2.440) -0.001** (-2.112) 
BI -0.000 (-0.014) -0.002 (-0.229) 
Duality 0.002* (1.692) 0.001 (0.580) 
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NBM 0.000*** (3.051) 0.000 (1.629) 
ROA 0.071*** (3.940) 0.037* (1.710) 
Fsize -0.004*** (-5.506) -0.005*** (-7.160) 
Lev 0.039*** (9.892) 0.028*** (6.994) 
Growth 0.007*** (5.526) 0.009*** (5.092) 
MTB 0.000 (1.060) 0.002*** (2.592) 
Loss 0.026*** (8.992) 0.014*** (6.206) 
Fage 0.000 (0.964) 0.000** (1.989) 
big4 0.002 (0.635) -0.001 (-0.702) 
Constant 0.133*** (7.525) 0.132*** (9.332) 
Industry/Year Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 7,247 6,225 
R-squared 0.080 0.100 
F 12.54 50.02 
This table presents the regression results for the subsample analyses of the 
impact of BC on EM at State and Non-State ownership. This table provides 
information about the role of ultimate controlling shareholder (soe=1) and 
those who are not the controlling shareholder (soe=0) A detailed description of 
the variables has been provided in table1. Industry and year effects have been 
controlled in the analysis F-statistic and R
2
 value has been reported; t-values 
are reported in brackets. Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5: Subsample Analysis of the Effect of BC on EM 
Variables Big4=0 Big4=1 HK=0 HK=1 dividend=0 dividend=1 
 EM EM EM EM EM EM 
BS -0.00*** -0.000 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** 
 (-3.397) (-0.497) (-3.658) (0.309) (-2.279) (-2.752) 
BI -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 0.011 0.004 -0.007 
 (-0.203) (-0.122) (-0.474) (0.507) (0.281) (-0.781) 
Duality 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.011* 0.003 0.001 
 (1.111) (1.242) (1.175) (1.678) (1.341) (0.967) 
NBM 0.001*** 0.000* 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 
 (4.962) (1.677) (5.317) (1.375) (1.341) (5.498) 
ROA 0.074*** 0.083 0.076*** 0.089 -0.114*** 0.179*** 
 (4.764) (1.275) (4.940) (1.568) (-3.582) (10.621) 
Fsize -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
 (-7.717) (-4.317) (-8.296) (-3.561) (-4.068) (-10.454) 
Lev 0.035*** 0.002 0.034*** 0.030* 0.027*** 0.040*** 
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 (11.477) (0.143) (11.360) (1.697) (5.192) (11.160) 
Growth 0.007*** 0.004 0.007*** 0.007 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (6.437) (0.899) (6.431) (0.994) (4.959) (4.876) 
MTB 0.001*** -0.003* 0.001*** -0.008** 0.001** 0.000 
 (4.158) (-1.957) (3.860) (-2.408) (2.508) (0.590) 
Loss 0.025*** 0.016** 0.025*** 0.012 0.009*** 0.021*** 
 (12.301) (2.225) (12.528) (1.578) (3.068) (4.261) 
Fage 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.668) (0.213) (1.552) (0.276) (1.376) (1.221) 
Constant 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.13*** 0.31*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 
 (10.829) (5.321) (11.660) (4.162) (5.985) (13.539) 
Year 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obser-
vations 
12,549 854 13,000 403 3,708 9,695 
R-Square 0.098 0.107 0.096 0.141 0.094 0.106 
F 26.64 . 27.44 2.247 8.699 21.73 
This table presents the substitution and complementary effect of different 
external governance mechanisms on the association between BC and  EM 
nexus. The regression results for the subsample analyses of the impact of BC 
on EM at different levels big4 auditors, a cross-listing of firms, and Dividend 
are given below. A detailed description of the variables has been provided in 
Appendix A. Industry and year effects have been controlled in the analysis, F-
statistic and R
2
 value has been reported; t-values are reported in brackets. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Additional tests 
We further use another proxy of EM to test the robustness of our results. In 
table 3, we followed the method of Kothari et al. (2005) and measure EM just 
like the modified Jones model along with adding one variable Return on Assets 
of the previous period to control the performance effect on the earnings 
management. The third column shows the impact of BC on EM by regressing 
only independent variables on the dependent variables. In columns 4, we are 
regressing the independent variables along with all control variables of column 
2 to control the firm characteristics. the results are consistent with our main 
models and therefore we conclude that we can use both proxies for studying the 
impact of BC on EM in the Chinese context. 
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Conclusion 
This study explores the relationship between BC (Board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, and Board meetings) and Earnings Management of 
A-share listed companies in China. We argue that the board structure is an 
important component of the internal governance system and it plays a 
significant role in reducing earnings management and thereby enhancing 
earnings quality. Board size depends upon the nature and scope of the business, 
therefore the size of the board should be according to the complex operation of 
the business. Independent directors in developing countries and especially in 
China are not affectively monitoring the top managers; therefore, there is an 
insignificant relationship between Board independence and discretionary 
accruals. This is in contrast to prior studies in other contexts (Klein, 2002; Biao 
Xie, Davidson Iii, & Dadalt, 2003). Furthermore, if the external governance 
mechanism is weak we expect that effective board structure can mitigate the 
earnings management and can enhance the board monitoring. 
The board meeting is positively and significantly related to discretionary 
accruals. It means that directors are not giving proper time to the meetings. 
According to Kang, et al. (2019) face to face meeting is not so much effective 
as compare to remote meeting. Further they explain that independent directors 
are busy and they can easily attend a remote meeting easily and also there are 
more chances of dissent with the management .Therefore, we expect that if 
directors are allowed to attend a remote meeting then there are more chances to 
perform their monitoring duty with full devotion and reducing the pressure for 
conformity. On the other hand, if there are more meetings of directors, it shows 
a signal that there is something going in wrong direction and directors are 
meeting again and again, and they are on same page with seniors managers to 
hide the bad performance of the firms. This result is in line with previous 
studies. It shows that financial reporting quality can be improved if the 
directors give full time with a focus on the meeting’s agenda items and to study 
these documents before attending these meetings. 
For robustness analysis, we used other proxy for the dependent variable 
and our results are in line with the main findings. Weak External governance 
mechanism can be substituted with affective board structure as well as with 
cross-listing of the shares on other stock exchanges. Using the subsample 
analysis we concluded that board size is very effective in SOE as compare to 
non-SOEs, as well as board meeting has a positive and significant relationship 
with EM in Non-SOE and insignificant relationship if the state is the majority 
shareholders. Therefore, we conclude that the board meeting of the state-
controlled firm is better than non-SOE. 
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Board structure, ownership structure, and auditor quality are very important 
factors of corporate governance in China. This study is based on non-financial 
firms therefore in future researchers can extend the findings of this study to 
financial firms and in addition, can also take other governance variables to 
check the full impact of overall governance mechanism on earnings 
management. 
This study is just a new contribution to the empirical studies on the nexus 
between BC and EM. The policymakers can focus on board-level corporate 
governance reforms such as board diversity, and also can focus on the quality 
of information, by either improving the disclosure of information or to reduce 
the hoarding of bad news, so that investors can make informed decisions on the 
time. Furthermore, policymakers should focus on the improvement of external 
governance mechanisms to safeguard the interest of the minority shareholders 
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